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Abstract  
Objectives: The shift in the balance of health care, bringing services ‘closer to home’, is a 
well established trend. This study sought to provide insight into the consequences of this 
trend, in particular the stimulation of demand, by exploring the underlying feedback 
structure. 
Methods: We constructed a simulation model using the system dynamics method, which is 
specifically designed for the analysis of feedback structure. The model was calibrated to two 
cases of the shift in cardiac catheterisation services in the UK. Data sources included archival 
data, observations and interviews with senior health care professionals. Key model outputs 
were the basic trends displayed by waiting lists and average waiting times, cumulative patient 
referrals, cumulative patient activity, and cumulative overall costs.  
Results: Demand was stimulated in both cases via several different mechanisms. We revealed 
the roles for clinical guidelines and capacity changes, the typical responses to imbalances 
between supply and demand. Our analysis also demonstrated the potential benefits of 
changing the goals that drive activity by seeking a waiting list goal rather than a waiting time 
goal.  
Conclusions: Appreciating the wider consequences of shifting the balance of care is essential 
if services are to be improved overall. The underlying feedback mechanisms of both intended 
and unintended effects need to be understood. Using a systematic  systemic [The editors 
have removed “joined-up thinking” and replaced it with “systematic”. All modelling 
approaches are systematic so we consider this term to be too broad. We wish to refer 
specifically to an approach that focuses on the connections between different parts of 
the system, crossing organisational boundaries, and taking into account the associated 
feedback effects. That is why we referred to “joined-up thinking”. If the editor 
specifically wants to avoid the reference to joined-up thinking then we feel that 
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“systemic” is the next best term to use] approach, more effective policies may be designed 
through coordinated programs rather than isolated initiatives, which may only have a limited 
impact. 
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Introduction 
The balance in health care in many systems is shifting towards the primary sector and 
services delivered ‘closer to home’.1-3 These changes include the development of outreach 
clinics, near patient testing, GPs undertaking minor surgery, telemedicine and day surgery. 
This trend has been motivated by the broad desire to improve the provision of services by 
alleviating pressure on hospital resources, by expanding capacity and thus reducing waiting 
times, and by providing more accessible care. However, the efforts to improve services 
overall may be undermined by the unintended consequences of service shifts, particularly if 
improvements in access stimulate demand. This general phenomenon has been frequently 
reported,4-7 but only anecdotal evidence is available with respect to service shifts. Demand 
increases are particularly problematic in the UK health care system, the National Health 
Service (NHS), where there are persistent concerns about excessive waiting lists and waiting 
times, and rising costs. Additional complexity arises as views about the value of stimulated 
demand vary7-9. 
Underlying the stimulation of demand are feedback structures, or closed causal 
relationships, since access influences demand and vice versa. The consequences of feedback 
structures are not always obvious. They may be delayed, counterintuitive, and cross 
organisational boundaries. Therefore, ‘joined-up’ or ‘whole systems’ thinking10-12 is required 
to understand them. However, existing analyses of the consequences of service shifts and the 
stimulation of demand in general have been limited to isolated parts of the system, based 
upon economic appraisals and surveys. Furthermore, these analyses have led to calls to 
control demand with stricter clinical guidelines or to meet demand with capacity 
increases10,13,14. However, these interventions may have only a limited impact due to the 
complexity of the underlying feedback mechanisms.  
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 The system dynamics simulation approach15 is specifically designed for the analysis of 
feedback structures. System dynamics contrasts with more familiar simulation modelling 
(e.g.16,17) in several ways18. In particular, the aims of system dynamics are more qualitative; 
that is to understand and improve patterns of behaviour (the basic trends), rather than produce 
point predictions. In this paper, we describe a system dynamics modelling study19 of a tertiary 
to secondary shift in the NHS: the shift in cardiac catheterisation (CC) services for low risk 
investigations20. The majority of elective cases are defined as low risk. We focus on the 
development of CC services at two English district general hospitals. For reasons of 
confidentiality, they are referred to as ‘Ribsley Hospital’ and ‘Veinbridge Hospital’.  
Prior to the introduction of district services, the elective demand for Veinbridge’s 
patients was met. However, there was a persistent problem of under-capacity for Ribsley’s 
patients. Consequently, temporary capacity increases had been provided at the tertiary level.   
At Veinbridge Hospital, the district CC service formed part of a long-term strategy to 
expand capacity and to develop cardiac services. Consequently, the district CC service was 
introduced and developed into a permanent service. Meanwhile, at Ribsley Hospital, due to 
resistance by purchasers, only temporary district CC services were provided. 
  
Methods 
Data collection included accessing hospital records, observational work, informal discussions 
and formal interviews with consultant cardiologists and hospital managers at the district 
hospitals and their main referral centre, with commissioners of health services and with 
managers of the company that provided a mobile catheterisation laboratory to the district 
hospitals. Information was elicited regarding the processes of care and the various factors that 
influenced decision making, which together formed the mechanisms underlying the 
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consequences of the shift in CC services. In considering ‘access’, we addressed both factors 
of ‘having access’ and ‘gaining access’21. 
System dynamics simulation models, which have a mathematical underpinning based 
upon differential equations, are most conveniently constructed using a purpose-built software 
package. Our simulation model was constructed using STELLA/ithink software. The model 
generates the supply and demand for the outpatient clinic (the main source of referral for an 
elective CC investigation) and for an elective CC investigation (Figure 1).   
In calibrating the model to our two case studies we produced two sets of parameters to 
reflect their different circumstances. Model calibration procedures involved the use of 
hospital data, expert estimates, simple calculations and preliminary simulations. Several 
parameters were calculated from the actual activity rates and assuming equilibrium with 
the desired waiting time goals maintained. [Note to authors: please rephrase for greater 
clarity. We propose the changes shown] For the Veinbridge case, we used the 
information that waiting times for CC were under control to calculate several 
parameters for which data was not available. Preliminary simulations derived several 
starting values and were used as a vehicle for standard techniques including sensitivity 
analysis. Confidence was gained in the model via established methods.22 One key test 
confirmed the model’s ability to replicate the problematic behaviour. This involved 
superimposing and comparing plots of simulated and actual behaviour.19  
We provided retrospective analyses by generating insight into how the shifts in services 
helped and hindered the provision of NHS cardiac services over time, and into how NHS 
providers and health service commissioners could have more effectively intervened to 
improve the provision of services. The experiments were conducted by making parameter and 
structural changes to the model. The interventions investigated included the use of stricter 
 7 
clinical guidelines, various approaches to capacity changes, and driving activity by seeking 
waiting list goals rather than waiting time goals.  
We evaluated and interpreted the experiments broadly in order to illustrate the trade-offs 
involved, and encapsulate the concerns of both NHS providers and health service 
commissioners. We considered several different aims. First, the need to improve health; i.e. 
identify patients in need of treatment (some patients with severe heart disease only display 
minor symptoms and these patients may thus fail to be identified by other diagnostic 
methods), provide health care promptly and appropriately, direct resources towards the most 
urgent cases, and increase activity and thus meet higher activity targets. Second, the need to 
control the overall costs incurred; i.e. ensuring that services are used appropriately. Third, the 
need to improve efficiency; i.e. deliver care at the lowest cost per case. Both supply and 
demand variables were considered across the cardiac referral chain. The key model outputs 
were the basic trends displayed by the waiting lists and average waiting times, cumulative 
patient referrals, cumulative patient activity, and cumulative overall costs.  
Whilst maintaining waiting time goals is a key policy aim, it is also important to control 
the waiting list length. Meeting the waiting time goal does not necessarily mean that the 
waiting list goal is met. The waiting list could be rising and this would imply that the waiting 
time goal is only being maintained by increases in patient activity. Therefore, controlling the 
waiting list is of importance to those involved in funding services and in dealing with the 
challenges of distributing limited resources.  
 
Results 
Changes in access 
At Ribsley, the district service prolonged the provision of capacity increases and thus 
produced dramatic improvements in access to elective services (Figure 2a). However, this 
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trend was reversed when the district service was withdrawn. A further temporary service was 
offered at a later date. This achieved further temporary improvements in access.  
Demand was stimulated in both cases and for both outpatient and CC services. The 
stimulation of demand was described during the interviews and informal discussions, and it 
was also reflected in the hospital data. There was sufficient supply to meet the CC 
investigation waiting time goals whilst the district CC services were in place. However, in the 
Veinbridge case, the increase in demand for an outpatient appointment (Figure 2b) produced 
severe detrimental effects on access to this service. This loss in access had not been 
anticipated. 
 
Basic feedback mechanisms 
Feedback mechanisms may be balancing, representing efforts to control and seek particular 
goals, or reinforcing where self-sustaining growth or decay occurs. The collaborators 
provided rich descriptions of several feedback mechanisms by which changes in access 
influenced demand. These mechanisms included those involving the average waiting time, 
the knowledge of patients and GPs of CC and the new CC service, and the skills and 
confidence of the doctors who referred patients for CC (Table). No other changes occurred 
during the 40-month observation period that could have accounted for the changes in 
demand. 
 The basic feedback mechanisms may be summarised (further details are provided 
elsewhere19) by a ‘fix that fails’24 (Figure 3) which is a simple structure that explains how 
problems increase over time. The increases in patient activity, facilitated by the use of district 
services, may be considered as efforts to ‘fix’ the ‘problem’ of poor or unsatisfactory access 
to cardiac services (a balancing process) with the stimulation of demand (a reinforcing 
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process) representing the side effects that limit the effectiveness of this fix. The model-based 
policy analyses thus focused on strengthening the fix and/or controlling the side effects. 
  
Clarifying the roles for capacity increases and stricter clinical guidelines  
The Veinbridge case illustrated that capacity increases are not necessarily the most effective 
way of improving access. For even if it had been possible to increase outpatient capacity, this 
would only have eliminated excessive waiting time, not the excessive waiting list. This is 
because efforts would have been made to maintain the desired waiting time but without 
controlling the waiting list length. In general, seeking a desired waiting time will only control 
the waiting time waiting list length if there are sufficient resources available to respond to 
increases in the waiting list by removing patients commensurately. [Question to authors: is 
this OK? No. The text, following the editorial changes, refers to controlling the waiting 
list length. We specifically wish to refer to efforts to control the waiting time. We then 
refer to the desire to control the waiting list length in the next sentence. We suggest the 
change shown above] The desired waiting list length will not necessarily be met at the same 
time as the desired waiting time. With sufficient slack in the system (by weakening the 
reinforcing loop in Figure 3), both goals could be met simultaneously by changing the forces 
that drive activity rates; i.e. seeking a desired waiting list length rather than a desired waiting 
time (strengthening the balancing loop). 
There was spare capacity for elective CC services and introducing controls on demand 
would have produced some slack for outpatient services (Figure 4). In fact, the combined 
policy would have overcompensated by producing an average waiting time that was lower 
than required. Of course, slack for outpatient services could also have arisen from removing 
the capacity constraint. However, this would not have been feasible as the purchasers were 
unwilling to further fund significant increases in outpatient activity.   
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The combined policy would have led to improvements in access and reductions in costs. 
There would have been trade-offs as the reductions in referrals and activity would have been 
in conflict with the desire to meet higher activity targets and identify more high risk patients. 
The mobile-based district CC service was as efficient as the tertiary-based CC service. When 
an integrated laboratory opened at Veinbridge, replacing the mobile facility, it provided the 
opportunity to improve the efficiency of the district service by increasing volume and this 
thus [the text should read “thus”] reducing the cost per case. 
The extent of the inherent imbalance between supply and demand at Ribsley was such 
that frequent capacity increases would have been necessary to provide permanent 
improvements in access (strengthening the balancing loop in Figure 3). Coordinating this 
policy with efforts to manage demand (weakening the reinforcing loop) would have ensured 
that the benefits of increasing supply were not cancelled out by stimulated demand. Whilst 
this would be obvious to NHS managers and clinicians, the usefulness of the analysis lay in 
the ability to explore different approaches to capacity increases and gain insight into the 
trade-offs involved between short-term and long-term effects, and between localised and 
broader consequences (Figure 5). On balance, it seemed that further temporary district 
services would have been the most practical approach to capacity increases, compared to a 
permanent district service and an expanded tertiary service.   
 
Discussion 
The feedback mechanisms, associated with service shifts have been neglected in spite of the 
increasing emphasis in health care on the need for ‘joined-up’ or ‘whole systems’ thinking10-
12. This paper presents empirical evidence of shifts in services stimulating demand derived 
from participants’ reports and graphical evidence derived from hospital activity data. The 
participants’ reports were tested and supported by our model. This paper also illustrates the 
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insights that system dynamics can offer and thus supports previous claims made regarding its 
usefulness in health care 18 and of operational research methods in general25-27.  
As with all models, this model is based upon certain simplifying assumptions. For 
example, in reality, there would be additional feedback mechanisms. Nevertheless, the model 
still successfully replicated the problematic behaviour for both cases. Furthermore, as the 
interactions between supply and demand are widely applicable, we believe that our findings 
may be generalised to other locations, times and service shifts, especially to shifts across the 
secondary/primary interface, which is the main current focus of this trend. Therefore, a 
number of broad policy lessons can be derived. 
The shift in the balance of care is a continuing trend, which is currently being promoted 
by government policies in the UK such as the new GP contract28 [Note to authors: reference 
needed – The reference has been inserted] where GPs are being encouraged to provide 
services that are traditionally carried out in hospitals. Our study provides insight into both the 
desirable and less desirable consequences of such service shifts. Whilst analysts have some 
understanding of the consequences of service shifts, they are still not universally appreciated 
by NHS managers and clinicians. 
Our study also demonstrates the limitations of the use of stricter clinical guidelines and 
capacity increases in improving access. This echoes and develops previous research2928. The 
Veinbridge case showed that individually these interventions would have provided similar 
leverage in improving behaviour (in terms of reducing the waiting list and average waiting 
time), but significantly better leverage could have been obtained by combining the use of 
stricter guidelines with changes to the goals that drive activity. This result arose from the 
existence of spare capacity and was not specific to the case of the shift in CC services. It was 
a general consequence of the interplay between supply and demand that determines the 
waiting list length and average waiting time. Although discussions of spare capacity in the 
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UK may seem incongruous with customary reports of  Even in situations with long NHS 
waiting lists and waiting times, [Note to authors: However, waiting times are falling 
rapidly at the moment, so our view of the NHS should change too! – Please see changes] 
some spare capacity is often released by service shifts, through their ability to provide 
additional capacity and/or by prioritising patients. By contrast, the Ribsley case illustrated the 
superior leverage of capacity increases in cases of extreme imbalance between supply and 
demand.  
We challenge the persistent tendency in health care towards a narrow focus on isolated 
events, short-term results and single performance measures, as well as the current emphasis 
in the NHS on waiting time rather than the length of the list.23 For example, the Veinbridge 
analysis showed how maintaining a waiting time goal did not necessarily mean that the 
system was not under pressure; the rise in the waiting list suggested that it was and the 
waiting time goal was only maintained because more money was poured in to raise activity 
levels. Another example arose from the Ribsley analysis.  We showed that a permanent 
district service at Ribsley would have only produced similar short-term qualitative 
improvements in access to CC services, compared to an expanded tertiary-based service. In 
addition, the former would have produced later problems of access to outpatient services.  
In the Veinbridge case, we illustrated how access problems can arise from the inability 
to cope with patient pressures. This related to the effect of changes in knowledge about 
CC on demand for services (see Table). It has been argued that clinical decisions should be 
driven by the preferences of patients30. Questions thus arise about how the shift in the balance 
of care can continue whilst providing high quality care to patients whose expectations are 
traditionally high. [Note to author: I have removed this paragraph because it did not 
seem to be integrated into the rest of the discussion. OK? – No. We are referring to the 
effect of changes in knowledge about CC on demand for services (please see key factor 
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“Knowledge” in Table) which was a key factor underlying the outpatient access 
problems that arose in the Veinbridge case. We propose reinstating the text with some 
changes as shown above. Please note that (a) this involves removing one reference to 
allow for the new GP contract reference and (b) by reinstating the text we still remain 
within the word limit] 
Whilst the NHS (a publicly funded, cash-limited system) formed the context to our case 
studies, our research findings may apply to shifts in health services in other countries in spite 
of the differences between their health systems. The stimulation of demand in response to 
improved access is a common response in the NHS since services are free at the point of 
delivery. However, services in most other health systems, whether private or insurance-based, 
are largely free at the point of use. The individual feedback mechanisms that we have 
discussed can be generalised to other health systems. Even the impact of waiting times on 
referrals can be generalised in spite of the fact that waiting lists are a typical characteristic of 
the NHS; in other systems, the waiting time may be translated into the price customers pay 
for services.  
In seeking improvements to the provision of services, we did not focus on changes in 
patient outcomes. The procedural complication rates did not change, so safety was not 
compromised in shifting services away from the tertiary centre, which offered surgical 
backup. In the Ribsley case, the waiting time for catheterisation dropped and this contributed 
to shorter delays for those requiring invasive treatment (coronary angioplasty or coronary 
bypass surgery). This could offer the potential for health benefits as treatment delays can lead 
to some patients deteriorating. The fraction referred on for a CC investigation increased in 
both cases. As the case mix of the patient populations did not change, this meant that the 
threshold for a CC investigation had changed to include less severe cases (defined without the 
benefit of a CC investigation). Catheterising more of these patients could lead to 
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improvements in health if it identified further patients in need of invasive treatment. The 
fraction of patients referred on for invasive treatment remained constant so associated with 
the increased catheterisation rate was an increased invasive treatment referral rate. This 
would suggest that, from the less severe cases, further patients in need of such treatment had, 
indeed, been identified. However, for these cases, it might have been better to delay bypass 
surgery until the disease was more advanced, since repeat bypass surgery, which can occur 
given the progressive nature of heart disease, carries higher risks. Therefore, delaying 
catheterisation (and therefore delaying bypass surgery) could, paradoxically, be beneficial in 
the long-term management of the disease. 
Applying our methods to explore shifts in other services would serve to test the 
generalisability of our findings and provide further insight into this health care trend. Further 
work could also consider the possible shifts in demand between different hospitals, and 
associated loss in income, as a result of service shifts.    
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Table Key feedback mechanisms.  
Key factor Feedback mechanism Notes 
Activity drivers  Adjustments in activity to meet desired 
waiting time. Balancing feedback loops. 
Policy analysis involved changing goal to 
desired waiting list length. 
 
CC waiting times  Demand suppressed by high waiting times 
and stimulated by low waiting times.  
Balancing feedback loop. 
Loop did not apply in the Veinbridge case 
because waiting times were not considered 
a factor in making decisions about referrals. 
In the Ribsley case, the suppression of 
demand was insufficient to control access. 
 
Knowledge  By developing a local CC service, GPs and 
patients become more knowledgeable about 
the benefits of CC and overcome anxiety 
about the risks, and thus more demanding 
for this service. The extent of this effect on 
demand increases as the district service 
grows generating more publicity and, 
through ‘word of mouth’, more reports of 
patients who have benefited. Reinforcing 
feedback loops. 
 
Affected CC and outpatient services. The 
increase in pressure produced outpatient 
capacity shortages at Veinbridge. 
Skills As junior staff gain skills and confidence as 
CC operators, they refer more. Accelerated 
learning by capacity increases and periodic 
effects occur due to the existence of training 
schemes and the staff rotation between 
different hospitals (e.g. periodic drops in 
referrals with the replacement of 
experienced juniors with novices). 
Reinforcing feedback loops.  
 
Expands upon a previous description23 by 
considering effect of confidence on 
referrals and variation of effects. Only 
refers to junior CC operators. Loop did not 
apply in the Veinbridge case because the 
consultant cardiologist (an expert CC 
operator) made all final decisions about 
referrals.  
 
Other waiting list 
removals 
Removals following review of the waiting 
list e.g. deaths, patient moved to another 
area, patient’s condition improved. Modelled 
as a constant fractional rate of the waiting 
list length as a simplifying assumption. 
Balancing feedback loops. 
 
Only significant in the Veinbridge case for 
outpatient services. 
Several other feedback mechanisms were modelled exogenously as simplifying assumptions 
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Physical Flow
Information Flow
Costs Sector
Patient activity costs
District preparation & running costs
Affordability limits
For OP appointments 
For elective CC investigations
Waiting Times Sector
Delivery Sector
Elective CC activity at tertiary level
Elective CC investigations at district level
Preparation & availability of district facility
Referrals Sector
OP referrals & activity
Referrals for elective CC investigations from
inpatients & outpatients
Skills Sector
Turnover of junior district operators
Loss & gain in district CC operator skills
 
Figure 1 Model overview 
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Figure 2 Consequences of district services: Improving access and stimulating demand. Black blocks indicate the 
use of district services. In (b), note that the stimulation of demand lags behind the introduction of district 
services due to the perception delays of GPs and patients. 
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Problem
Fix
Side
Effects
Balancing 
Feedback Loop
Reinforcing 
Feedback Loop
De
lay
A fix, effective in the short-term, 
has side effects which may require 
even more use of the same fix.
 
Figure 3 Fixes that fail  
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Figure 4 Meeting the outpatient waiting list and waiting time targets for the Veinbridge case. District services 
were available from month 13 onwards. The outpatient waiting list goal was 338 patients and the waiting time 
goal was 3.5 months.  
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Figure 5 Increasing elective CC capacity for the Ribsley case. The outpatient waiting list graphs for runs 0 and 
3 are the same. District services were available from months 14 to 23 and months 34 to 38. The outpatient 
waiting list goal was 424 patients. The CC investigation waiting list goal, 60 patients, was halved during the 
periods when the district service was present, reflecting how expectations rose and efforts were made to 
‘squeeze’ more out of the system.  
 
 
 
 
